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Eleventh Annual Education Law Conference 
The Equal Access Act: Still Controversial After All These Years 
Congress enacted the Equal Access Act! almost twenty years ago in order to 
guarantee that student religious clubs would have the right to meet in public high schools 
on the same terms as other noncurricular clubs. The statute followed on the heels of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincenr requiring a state university to grant 
student religious organizations the same rights of access to use campus facilities as other 
recognized student groups. In Widmar, the Supreme Court based its decision on the First 
Amendment's public forum doctrine and rejected the University's attempt to rely on the 
Establishment Clause to justify its discriminatory treatment of religious organizations. 
The Court did not decide, however, whether similar rights of access would be 
constitutionally mandated in the context of public secondary schools.3 
Congress, preferring not to wait for the Court to answer this unresolved question, and 
in the aftermath of several lower court decisions that rejected access claims by student 
religious groups at public high schools,4 enacted the Equal Access Act on August 11, 
1984 to mandate access rights at public high schools that receive federal financial 
assistance. Under its provisions, equal access obligations are imposed on public high 
schools that permit noncurricular student organizations to meet during noninstructional 
times and thereby create "limited public forums. ,,5 Despite a narrow Congressional 
purpose that focused on an effort to prevent discrimination against student religious 
clubs, the statute is broadly worded to prevent discrimination "on the basis of the 
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech.,,6 The broad scope of the 
Act's protections is necessary to avoid violations of both the free speech guarantee, as 
recognized in Widmar, and the Establishment Clause. 
' 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2004). 
2454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
3 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the fact that "[ u jniversity students are, of course, young 
adults" and "are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the 
University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion." Id. at 274 n.14. The Court did not, however, 
address the issue of whether the greater impressionability of younger students would be sufficient to justifY 
exclusion of a student Bible club at a public high school. 
4 Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1041 (5th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983) (striking down school board policy that provided "The School Board 
permits students to gather at the school with supervision either before or after regular school hours on the 
same basis as other groups as determined by the school administration to meet for any educational, moral, 
religious or ethical purposes so long as attendance at such meetings is voluntary."); Brandon v. Guilderland 
Bd. of Ed., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981) (Students for Voluntary 
Prayer were denied permission to conduct prayers on school grounds: "The record indicates that school 
buses discharge students at the Guilderland High School between 7:20 a.m. and 7:40 a.m., and that the 
official school day 'begins' at this point. Any voluntary student prayer meetings conducted after the arrival 
of the school buses and before the formal 'homeroom' period at 7:50 a.m., therefore, would occur during 
school hours. The prayer meetings would create an improper appearance of official support, and the 
prohibition against impermissibly advancing religion would be violated."). 
5 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071 (a) and (b). 
6 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (a). 
174 
W3. The Equal Access Act: Still Controversial After All These Years 
Schools that trigger the statute's provisions by creating a limited public forum are 
required to provide "equal access" and "a fair opportunity" to stuClent groups that wish to 
meet on school property as well as refrain from discriminating against such groupS.7 The 
statute specifies five "fair opportlmity criteria" that operate as a safe harbor for school 
officials. Schools are in compliance with the fair opportunity requirement of the statute if 
they uniformly require that the meetings of student groups be "voluntary and student 
initiated," refrain from sponsoring such meetings, require that employees of the school 
may be present, but not participate in meetings of student religious groups, preclude 
meetings that materially and substantially disrupt the school's educational activities and 
preclude nonschool persomlel from playing a significant role in the group's activities.8 
Since its enactment, the Equal Access Act has produced a steady stream of 
controversies. The diverse range of issues that have been raised include whether allowing 
clubs to meet during the lilllch hour satisfies the statutory trigger of allowing clubs to 
meet during "noninstructional time," whether the statute creates rights in addition to the 
right to hold meetings on school premises, such as the right to distribute literature about a 
club or pse the school's public address system, what constitutes a nonculTicular student 
club, and whether the access rights created under the act also apply to gay and lesbian 
student organizations. Many of these disputes are complicated by the fact that the student 
group bringing the legal challenge also relies on the First Amendment's free speech 
guarantee and the public high school defenqing against the lawsuit asserts an 
Establishment Clause justification for its actions. 
The Supreme Court has considered issues arising under the Equal Access Act only 
once since the emctment of the statute. In 1990, in the case of Board of Education of the 
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,9 the Supreme COlUt both interpreted the Act's 
provisions and upheld it against a constitutional challenge based on the First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause. In Mergens, the Westside High School allowed 30 
student groups and clubs to meet in the school building after school had ended for the 
day. When a group of students asked permission to start a Christian club to pray, read 
from and discuss the Bible and have fellowship, school officials rejected their request on 
the ground that allowing the club to meet would violate the Establishment Clause. 
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the statute, considered the meaning of the term 
"nonculTiculum related student group," a telTU left undefined by the Equal Access Act. 
Relying on the text and legislative history of the statute, the Court concluded that the 
term should be broadly interpreted "to mean any student group that does not directly 
relate to the body of courses offered by the school."IO In defining "noncurricuhull 
related," the Court first focused on the opposing concept of cUlTiculum-related. It 
identified four criteria used to determine if a student group directly relates to the school's 
cUlTiculum: (1) "if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be 
7Id. 
s 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (e). 
9496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
10 Id. at 239. 
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taught, in a regularly offered course;" (2) "if the subject matter of the group concerns the 
body of courses as a whole;" (3) "if participation in the group is required for a particular 
course; or" (4) "if participation in the group results in academic credit."ll 
Supplementing its list of general criteria, the Court also provided examples. The 
Court expressed the view that the practices of a student orchestra would be curriculum-
related if participation was required of those enrolled in music classes at the school or if 
academic credit was awarded for participation. 12 A French club would be curriculum-
related if the school included a course in French in its curriculum or was planning to offer 
the course in the near future. 13 
In addition to clubs related to particular curricular offerings, the Court also 
recognized that a club might be related to the school's curriculum as a whole. The 
example it offered was student government if "it addresses concerns, solicits opinions, 
and formulates proposals pertaining to the body of courses offered by the school.,,14 
Interestingly, student government organizations were not identified as potentially within 
the category of curriculum-related based on the fact that the school curriculum included 
the study of government in some of its courses. Indeed, the Court specifically rejected the 
school's argument that "stude~t government clubs 'advance the goals of the School's 
political science classes by providing an understanding and appreciation of government 
processes. ,,,t5 
, 
The Court also gave examples of noncurriculum related clubs. These included "a 
chess club, a stamp collecting club, or a community service c1ub.,,16 While the Court did 
not conclude that such clubs could never be considered to be curricular-related, it put the 
burden on thb school to demonstrate that such clubs were din,ctly related to the 
curriculum. 17 In doing so, it specifically rejected the school's argument that a club should 
be considered related to the curriculum if it its subject matter is "remotely related to 
abstract educational goals.,,18 According to the Court: 
Allowing such a broad interpretation of "curriculum-related" would make 
the [Act] meaningless. A school's administration could simply declare that 
it maintains a closed forum and choose which student clubs it wanted to 
allow by tying the purposes of those clubs to some broadly defined 
educational goal. At the same time the administration could arbitrarily 
deny access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis 
of its speech content. This is exactly the result that Congress sought to 
prohibit by enacting the [Act]. A public secondary school cannot simply 
11 Id. at 239-40. 
12 Id. at 240. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 244. 
16Id. at 240. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 244. 
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declare that it maintains a closed forum and then discriminate against a 
particular student group on the basis of the content of the speech of that 
group. 19 
The Court also considered and rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the 
facial validity of the statute. It found that the purpose of the statute, to eliminate 
viewpoint-based discrimination against student groups, was a secular purpose and that the 
statute's effect, which was to create an 0ppOliunity for a multiplicity of student groups to 
meet at public high schools without significant involvement by school personnel, was 
similar to the effect in Widmar v. Vincent and was not constitutionally problematic.2o 
Since Mergens, a wide array of issues have arisen over the scope of the rights created 
by the Equal Access Act. Some of the issues are made more difficult to resolve because 
ofthe absence of clear directions in the statute. While the statute defines the key statutory 
trigger of a "limited open forum," it does so by providing that a limited open forum is 
created when a "school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more 
noncurriculum related student groups to meet during noninstructional time.,,21 
Unfortiinately, it fails to define "non curriculum related" and only defines 
"noninstmctional time" as "time set aside by the school before actual classroom 
instruction begins or after actual classroom instmction ends. ,,22 Moreover, while the 
statute guarantees "equal access," it fails to specify what rights are included within that 
statutory term. 
This vagueness in the statute's terms has left room for significant disagreements over 
the meaning of those terms. In some of those disputes, issues have arisen over whether a 
school has or h~s not limited student groups to those that are curricvlum-related.23 In 
other disputes, major issues have arisen over whether the time used by clubs to meet is 
noninstructional time or not. Some courts have limited noninstmctional time to time 
before or after the school day while others have included times such as the lunch hour 
19 Id. at 244-45 (quoting from Mergens v. Bd. 0/ Educ., 867 F.2d 1076. 1078 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
20 I d. at 247-53. 
21 20 U.S.C. § 4701 (b). 
22 20 U.S.C. § 4702 (4). 
23 Compare East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. a/Educ. a/Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 
2d 1166 (C.D. Utah 1999) (finding Future Homemakers of America, Future Business Leaders of America 
and National Honor Society to be cun-iculum-related) with Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 
1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the Key Club, a student service organization connected with the Kiwanis, 
was not curriculum-related). 
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when classes are not in session.24 Issues have even arisen over when the school day 
2- -
begins. ' 
While the focus of the Act is on the opportunity for student groups to use school 
facilities for their meetings, cases arising under the Act have also raised substantial issues 
over whether it mandates that religious clubs receive other benefits provided to student 
clubs such as opportunities to publicize the meetings and activities of a student group and 
the availability of various sources of funds made available to student groups. This issue 
was first addressed in Mergens. In that case, the Court concluded, without discussion, 
that the equal access rights guaranteed by the statute meant that the student Bible club 
was entitled to the same opportunities to publicize club activities as other student 
groups.26 
While most courts have followed the lead of Mergens and granted access on the same 
terms as are made available to other student groups,27 the resolution of this issue, 
however, is not always without controversy. It is made more complicated by the fact that 
the statute contains several provisions that limit the access available to students. One such 
provision is the right of the school to act "to maintain order and discipline on school 
premises" as well as "to protect the well-being of students and faculty.,,28 Another 
limitation is the fact that the statute must be interpreted not to authorize the school "to 
expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing the space for student-
initiated meetings. ,,29 Thus access to school fuftds may be beyond the reach of the 
24 Compare Pri~ce v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. ct. 62 (2003) 
(finding that studentlstaff time is instructional time because student attendance is req\!ired even though no 
formal classroom instruction takes place during this time period) with Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trustees of the 
San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997) (rmding that lunch hour is noninstructional 
time). 
25 Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that the school day 
does not include either homeroom or an activity period both of which occur prior to the first classroom 
period). 
26 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247. ("Although the school apparently permits respondents to meet informally 
after school, App. 315-316, respondents seek equal access in the form of official recognition by the school. 
Official recognition allows student clubs to be part of the student activities program and carries with it 
access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual Club Fair. Id. at 
434-435. Given that the Act explicitly prohibits denial of 'equal access ... to ... any students who wish to 
conduct a meeting within [the school's] limited open forum' on the basis of the religious content of the 
speech at such meetings, § 4071(a), we hold that Westside's denial of respondents' request to form a 
Christian club denies them 'equal access' under the Act."). 
27 See, e.g., Westside High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 118 n.17 (D. 
Mass. 2003) ("Additionally, denying the LIFE Club official school recognition would violate the Equal 
Access Act if such a designation would allow the Club to be 'part of the student activities program' and to 
have access to the school bulletin, school bulletin boards, and the public address system."). But see 
Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379, 1383-84 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (students wishing 
to distribute a religious newspaper in school hallways were not protected by the Equal Access Act since 
their conduct was not a "meeting" under § 4072 (3) ofthe Act). 
28 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (t). 
29 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (d). 
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statute's protections. These limitations arguably compromise the statutory goal of 
equality of opportuuity for all student groups. 
One recent case in which a claim under the statute was rejected illustrates the 
relevance of these limitations on the scope of access rights. In Gernetzke v. Kenosha 
Unified School District,30 a student Bible club challenged the principal's censorship of 
the Bible club's design for a hall mural. The case was triggered by the fact that the school 
had invited all student organizations to submit sketches for a mural to be painted in the 
main hallway. The principal approved the club's design, which included a Bible open to a 
well known passage from the New Testament, but refused to allow the mural to include a 
large cross. The principal had also refused to allow a group of skinheads to paint a mural 
containing a swastika and to allow Students Against Drunk Driving to include a reference 
to a specific brand of beer in its mural. When the exclusion of the cross was challenged 
uuder the Equal Access Act, the court found no discrimination based on the club's views 
because the principal's reasons for excluding the cross were his fear of litigation and fear 
of conflicts among the members of the student body. 31 In upholding the principal's 
decision, the court cited to section 4071(f) of the Equal Access Act which limits the act 
so it does not restrict the authority of the school to "maintain order and good discipline on 
school premises.,,32 The court found that the principal was not discriminating against 
religion, but was banning displays that would lead to litigation or disruption.33 
The Ninth Circuit in Prince v. Jacobi4 also at~mpted to interpret the statute to steer 
a course between the two potentially contradictory aspects of the statute. In Prince, the 
Bethel School District granted a student Bible club, World Changers, only some of the 
rights available to other student clubs. The discriminatory treatment was challenged in a 
lawsuit filed by one of the student members of the club based on both the Equal Access 
Act and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In considering the challenge, the 
Ninth Circuit first addressed the statutory issues. It concluded that uuder the Equal 
Access Act the Bible club was entitled to participate in various fund-raising activities, 
have a club photograph appear in the yearbook at no cost, post flyers on bulletin boards 
and use the school's public address system on the same basis as other clubs?5 However, 
relying on the Act's focus on noninstructional time and its fuuding restriction, it denied 
the Bible club the right to meet during instructional time36 as well as the right to use 
school supplies, audio/visual equipment and school vehicles?7 
Prince also presents a good opportunity to review the interaction between the Equal 
Access Act and the First Amendment, an issue the Supreme Court refused to address in 
30 274 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2001). 
31ld at 466. 
32 1d at 467. 
33 ld at 466. 
34 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Cl. 62 (2003). 
35 1d at 1086-87. 
36 ld at 1087-89 
37 1d. at 1090. 
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Mergens. 38 In Prince, having found that the statute precluded granting a variety of 
benefits to the Bible club, the court went on to consider whether these restrictions were 
consistent with the free speech rights of the members of the Bible club.39 The court 
concluded that the Bible club was entitled to meet in classrooms during instructional 
time, receive school supplies, borrow audio/visual equipment and use school vehicles on 
the same basis as other student groups under the First Amendment. 
Citing Widmar and similar cases, the court found that all of the restrictions imposed 
on the Bible club were based on the viewpoint of the club and were unconstitutional 
under the free speech clause of the First Amendment.4o Moreover, according to the Court, 
nothing in the Establishment Clause precluded the club from receiving the same benefits 
as other student groups.41 Therefore, by combining statutory and constitutional reasoning, 
the Ninth Circuit found that the Bible club was entitled to complete parity of treatment 
with other student clubs.42 
A dissenting opinion in Prince saw things differently. According to Judge Berzon, 
Congress limited the reach of the Equal Access Act in order to avoid any violation of the 
Establishment Clause.43 Thus the limitations on the use of classrooms during instructional 
time and the funding restrictions were designed to avoid a clash between the statute and 
the Establishment Clause. Analyzing the grant of such benefits under the Supreme 
Court's Establishment Clause precedents, Judge Berzon dissented from the majority's 
view that such benefits were constitutionally required and found them to be barred by the 
Establishment Clause.44 Other courts have expressed similar reservations over whether 
the First Amendment grants rights to student religious groups that go beyond the 
statutory guan!lltees of the Equal Access Act45 , 
While the primary concern of the sponsors of the Equal Access Act focused on 
discrimination against student religious groups, the language of the statute is not limited 
to the protection of such groups. The Act protects student groups generally against 
discrimination on the basis of the content of their speech. Nevertheless, until recently the 
cases that have arisen under the Act have involved access claims by religious groups. 
Several recent cases, however, have raised the rights of gay and lesbian student groups 
under the Act. The results of this group of cases have been mixed. In one case, a federal 
district court, relying on a strained interpretation of the Act, concluded that the high 
38 496 U.S. 226, 247. 
39 303 F.3d at 1090. 
40 Jd at 1090-92. 
41 Id at 1092-94. 
42 See also Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that 
student conduct in distributing a religious newspaper in school hallways was protected by the First 
Amendment even though it was not a meeting within the meaning ofthe Equal Access Act). 
43 303 F.3d at 1098 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part). 
44 Ed at 1097. 
45 Gernelzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Disl., 274 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Wle shall not conceal 
our doubts that the First Amendment has a broader scope than the Equal Access Act."). 
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school at issue did not permit noncurriculum related student groups to meet, thereby 
denying access to the gay/straight alliance. 46 By contrast, several courts have granted 
preliminary injunctions against high schools that refused to allow a gay/straight alliance 
club to meet.47 
Over its twenty-year history, the Equal Access Act has continued to spark 
controversy. Despite a large mnnber of court decisions that have interpreted the scope of 
the statute, those controversies have not yet subsided nor are they likely to for the 
foreseeable future. Interpretation of the Equal Access Act is complicated by ambiguities 
in the statute's language and the complex relationship that exists between the statute and 
the First Amendment's prohibition on religious establishments combined with its 
protection for freedom of expression. The delicate constitutional balancing act that the 
statute attempts to accomplish complicates the task of statutory interpretation in a way 
that courts have still been unable to fully resolve. 
, 
\ 
46 East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 
(C.D. Utah 1999). 
47 Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County. Kentucky, 258 F. 
Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Colin v. Orange County Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (CD. Cal. 
2000). 
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